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ABSTRACT 
There is a movement underway to eliminate the practice of tipping restaurant servers that 
is gaining momentum (Goldberger, 2015).  In lieu of gratuities, restaurants are simply raising 
menu prices or assessing a service charge and paying servers a fixed hourly wage (Kummer, 
2016). Before restaurateurs can adopt such a strategy, they need to thoroughly understand the 
factors that affect tipping behavior in order to develop meaningful fixed wage rates that do not 
diminish service levels or employee morale.  The first step in this process is a better 
understanding of the determinants of tipping rates. 
The existing research has identified many factors that influence tipping rates.  Some 
factors are outside of the server’s control such as the server’s and the customer’s race, the size of 
the bill, the size of the dining party, and whether or not alcohol was consumed.  Other factors are 
within the servers control such as the quality of the service, whether they squatted at the table, or 
wrote a smiley face on the guest check.  Most of this research, however, is based on empirical 
analysis using small samples sizes and/or questionnaires that may not reflect actual behavior, or 
data from interviews based on what consumers say they did.  The contribution of this research is 
that I identified two additional significant determinants of tipping rates, sales tax rates and 
discount rates, which have not previously been studied.  This research also extends the previous 
research related to the impact of bill size and dining party size but with a significantly larger 
sample.  The study presented herein includes an analysis over 75 million guest checks from 43 
brand-name restaurants across 1,202 locations over three years to understand precisely how 
customers behaved. 
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The data were analyzed using a two-way fixed effects, ordinary least squares model to 
limit time and spatial controls to a single national time trend with state fixed effects.  The state 
fixed effects control for differences across states that are fixed over time and quarterly fixed 
effects will control for factors that impact tipping rates equally across all states in a given 
quarter.  Robust standard errors were clustered for the 43 restaurant brands and twelve quarters 
of time to account for temporal serial correlation in the error terms within the locations. 
The analysis revealed that there is a positive relationship between sales tax rates and 
tipping rates and an inverse relationship between discount rates and tipping rates. This essentially 
implies that consumers are tipping on the post-tax bill net of any discounts.  The study also 
confirms the results of certain prior research in that both party size and bill size are inversely 
related to tipping rates up to a certain point.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Overview 
There is a movement underway to eliminate the practice of tipping restaurant servers that 
is gaining momentum (Cox, 2016).  In lieu of gratuities, restaurants are simply raising menu 
prices or assessing a service charge and paying servers a higher and fixed hourly wage rate 
without the potential for tips (Kummer, 2016).  Restaurateurs’ motivations for this change are 
numerous.  Some wish to balance the pay gap between relatively higher paid tipped servers and 
their counterparts in the kitchen who are ineligible for tips and often make a fraction of the 
server’s effective hourly pay rate.  Others wish to divert some of the servers’ compensation into 
their own account to offset the rising cost of wages and mandated benefits. Still others want to 
take control of their employees’ compensation away from the customer (Goldberger, 2015).  
Finally, some see tipping as an opportunity and an incentive for both servers and customers to 
discriminate against one another (Lu-in, 2014).  
The National Restaurant Association estimates the size of the U.S. restaurant industry in 
2017 to be $799 billion with the full service segment accounting for approximately $260 billion 
of that total.  And current etiquette guidelines call for the tip at full service restaurants to equal 
15% to 20% of the pretax bill amount (Post, 2009).  Assuming patrons of full service restaurants 
tip at a rate equal to 20% of the bill size, annual tipped income to full service restaurant 
employees would amount to roughly $52 billion.  Explicitly transferring the burden of server 
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compensation through an increase in menu prices or a service charge has significant 
ramifications for the server, the customer, the employer, and the IRS.   
Historically, little consideration has been given by employers to the compensation earned 
by tipped employees in restaurant establishments.  These employees are paid gratuities funded by 
the consumer in addition to the prevailing tipped hourly minimum wage by their employer.  The 
tipped hourly minimum wage is generally lower than the statutory minimum wage mandated by 
the Department of Labor or local municipality because, when supplemented by gratuities, the 
employee’s effective hourly pay rate meets the federal minimum wage guideline.  Employers 
have been required to remit payroll taxes on the amount of tipped income declared by the 
employee since 1987.  However, those taxes can be used as a credit for up to 75% of the federal 
income tax obligation (FICA Tip Tax Credit).  Given that employers generally pay the requisite 
and discounted minimum wage rate and that the payroll tax obligation on tips can be used to 
offset three-quarters of the federal tax obligation, the economic incentive to manage server 
wages or hours employed has been relatively insignificant. 
If a restaurant company were to move away from tipping towards a fixed hourly wage 
rate, management would have to make a number of economic decisions that affect menu prices 
or service charges, server pay rates, tax obligations, and the consumer experience.  Under this 
regime, employers could no longer dismiss the current cost of employing servers and must 
devise competitive and motivating wage rates across its roster of servers and the various 
geographies in which they operate.  A logical next step in developing new pay schemes for 
servers who are currently tipped is to further understand the determinants of tipping rates and the 
underlying consumer behavior in order to develop new, equitable, and motivating pay programs. 
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A move away from tipping could create a boon for taxing jurisdictions and the IRS.  If 
restaurateurs offset the cost of higher fixed wages for servers with menu price increases or 
service charges, then their sale tax obligation would increase from higher revenue and service 
charges, which are also sales taxable.  In addition, the widespread underreporting of tipped 
income would no longer be an issue as the IRS would finally have visibility into all server wages 
subject to payroll taxes.  The underreporting of tipped income has resulted in a tax collection rate 
of 15% from all tipped workers (Anderson & Bodvarsson, 2005).  Finally, employers would lose 
the FICA Tip Tax Credit on their federal returns.         
Statement of the Problem 
As will be discussed in Chapter 2, existing research regarding the impact of the size of 
the dining party and the size of the bill on restaurant tipping rates are inconsistent in their 
findings and methods.  Previous research has also relied on less internally and externally valid 
methods of study including: small sample sizes, surveys of less than 2,000, experiments, 
interviews of less than 200, and simulations.   
Existing studies also have not addressed two potential factors that influence tipping rates: 
sales discounts, and sales tax rates.  The presence of a large sales discount (e.g. buy-one-get-one 
free) or a sales tax rate that could add as much as 10% to the price of the meal is significant 
economic components of the restaurant transaction.  Accordingly, they could be meaningful 
influencers on tipping behavior.  The inclusion of these factors will also give us additional 
insight into consumer behavior and how sales discounts and sales tax are considered when 
deriving a tip. 
In this paper I analyze the effect of the previously unexamined factors of sales discounts 
and sales tax rates on tipping rates, but also extend existing research regarding how the size of 
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the dining party and the size of the bill influence tipping rates in restaurants.  My primary 
contribution to the literature is the fact that I use a significantly larger sample encompassing over 
75 million restaurant bills to analyze these relationships which allows me to employ more robust 
statistical methods.  
Research Questions 
The first two questions are novel and have not been explored in previous studies of 
tipping rates.  The last two research questions focus on the impact of certain transaction 
characteristics on tipping rates and are extensions of existing research with a significantly larger 
and more diverse data set.   
 (RQ1) What is the effect of sales discounts on tipping rates?  
(RQ2) What is the effect of sales tax rates on tipping rates?  
(RQ3) What is the effect of dining party size on tipping rates?  
(RQ4) What is the effect of bill size on tipping rates?  
Significance 
 
The primary impact of this research is to aid restaurant practitioners in understanding the 
impact that certain factors have on tipping rates in order to develop new, equitable and 
motivating pay programs.  The variables under study are of particular importance because they 
are out of the servers’ control.  The results of this study will help restaurateurs develop 
meaningful hourly wage rates within each restaurant and across its restaurants’ geographies in 
the event the norm of tipping is abolished or voluntarily eliminated. 
This research will also answer novel questions regarding the direct impact of sales tax 
rates and sales discount rates on tipping rates.  Finally, this research will extend the existing 
literature regarding the impact of bill size, and party size on tipping rates by utilizing a 
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significantly larger and more objective data set than that used in prior research because it 
includes the actual data processes through the POS system and not what consumers say they did 
nor what they said they would do. 
Theoretical Foundation 
 
The motivation for the results posed by RQ1 and RQ2 may lie in the theory of bounded 
rationality proposed by Herbert Simon (Simon, 1982).  According to this theory, the classic 
economic assumption of rational, wealth maximizing behavior is bounded, or violated, in 
practice because there are limits to our thinking capacity, available information, and time.  The 
theory of bounded rationality would support that when faced with a tipping decision, consumers 
apply a heuristic that is even more simplistic than computing a range of 15% to 20% of the bill.  
The theory would also support consumers not “grossing-up” their bill by adding back sales 
discounts to determine the appropriate tipping base before computing the tip amount.  The same 
theory applies to sales tax in that consumers would not locate the pretax subtotal on the bill or 
deduct the sales tax from the amount due when determining the appropriate tipping base.  It is far 
less taxing to look at the total amount due at the bottom of the bill and compute the gratuity upon 
that base.  The reason for not performing one or more of the above tasks could potentially be due 
to: (1) the calculus being too complex (2) uncertainty in the magnitude of the sales discount (3) 
time constraints to locate or compute the pretax subtotal, or (4) a combination of all the above.  
As a result, I hypothesize that consumers will not tip on the value of a free or discounted meal.  
Furthermore, I hypothesize that consumers will calculate their tip on the bill size inclusive of 
sales tax.  While both of these practices are outside the bounds of accepted etiquette, the 
consumers’ bounded rationality moves them to behave in such a manner.  In recent years, 
restaurants have attempted to break the bonds of bounded rationality by pre-printing the 
6 
 
suggested tip amount at various tipping rates (i.e. 15%, 18%, 20%) on the pretax total to 
overcome some of the consumers’ implied shortcomings.  
RQ3 and RQ4 have been previously studied and the theory behind the related hypotheses 
will be discussed in the literature review chapter. 
Hypotheses 
(H1) As sales discounts as a percentage of the gross bill increase, the tipping rate (tip 
amount / gross bill amount) decreases.   
(H2) As sales tax rates increase, tipping rates (tip amount / gross bill amount) will 
increase. 
(H3) As the size of the dining party increases, the tip rate decreases.   
(H4) As the size of the bill increases, the tip rate decreases. 
 
Summary of Methodology 
 
The data were analyzed using a two-way fixed effects ordinary least squares model to 
limit time and spatial controls to a single national time trend with state fixed effects.  The state 
fixed effects control for differences across states that are fixed over time and quarterly fixed 
effects will control for factors that impact tipping rates equally across all states in a given 
quarter.  Robust standard errors were clustered for the 43 restaurant brands and twelve quarters 
of time to account for temporal serial correlation in the error terms within the locations. 
Limitations 
 The data retained for analysis included only those transactions that were tendered entirely 
by a credit card and the credit card tip amount could be verified through credit card processing.  
As a result, transactions tendered in cash where there was likely a cash tip were excluded from the 
analysis because it could not independently be verified.  Any variation in tipping behavior between 
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transactions settled with cash versus credit card is not addressed and the literature is ambiguous.  
While Parrett (2006) stated that the size of the tip was not dependent on the method of payment, 
Lynn & McCall (2000) stated otherwise.  Additionally, Feinberg (1986) revealed that the presence 
of credit card cues (e.g. credit card company logoed check presenter) influenced the use and 
behavior of credit card users. 
 The sample of restaurants in this study was obtained from a single restaurant back-office 
software provider.  Accordingly, the guest checks analyzed do not represent a random sample of 
guest checks from all full service restaurants operating in the United States which may limit the 
generalizability of the results. 
 The dates on which the transactions took place represent a thirty-six month timeframe 
ending on June 30, 2016.  Transactions outside the scope of this time frame could have been subject 
to different tipped minimum wage and sales tax rates and the relation between tipping levels and 
the regressors could have impacted the results. 
 This study addresses tipping behavior in full service restaurants.  Tipping is known to occur 
under other limited or quick service formats, but the tipped employee is likely not subject to the 
tipped minimum wage rate because the amount of tips would be insufficient for the employee to 
meet the federal minimum wage hourly rate guidelines.  The difference in tipping behavior 
between full service and other service formats is unknown.   
 Finally, the control variables in this study do not include a measure of service quality nor 
do they account for demographic variations (i.e. race, gender, age) in the tipped server or the 
customer.  
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF CERTAIN RESTAURANT TIPPING DETERMINANTS 
Introduction 
 
 Neo-classical economic theory provides no motivation for patrons to tip their servers.  
The tipping process occurs after the meal has been consumed and the related services have been 
rendered.  Therefore, there is no rational economic benefit from providing the tip (Parrett, 2006).  
The behavior is clearly driven by social norms and the utilities gained from adherence to this 
norm such as: buying off the envy of the server (Foster, 1972), displaying one’s superiority 
(Azar, 2004a, 2004b), and avoiding guilt or social disapproval (Azar, 2004a, 2004b).  However, 
beyond the demands of conforming to a social norm there are other factors that can influence 
tipping rates on the margin such as party size, bill size, race and gender of both server and 
customer, sales tax rates, and discount rates. 
 The purpose of this literature review is to identify articles related to restaurant tipping and 
one of four purported explanatory variables for tipping behavior: bill size, party size, sales 
discount, and sales tax.  As some of the seminal research on tipping and behavioral economics 
extends back over 50 years, no time constraint was placed on the literature search.  The body of 
research on tipping is relatively limited, so the search was broad enough to include all articles 
satisfying the search phrase, “restaurant and tip” or “restaurant and gratuity.”  The use of the 
word “restaurant” was key as to omit other service encounters that include tipping (e.g. taxi 
drivers, doorman, hairdresser, etc.).  Results from these searches were manually collated into 
salient and irrelevant aspects of tipping as they relate to my research.     
9 
 
Bill Size 
 Since the tip is generally calculated as some percentage of the bill amount, it is not 
surprising that the tip amount is positively correlated with the size of the bill and is most 
important in determining the size of the tip (Rogelberg, Ployhart, Balzer, & Yonker, 1999), 
(Lynn & Grassman, 1990), (Freeman, Walker, Borden, & Latane, 1975).  The more interesting 
question is what effect the bill size has on the tip as a percentage of the sale, the tipping rate.   
Chapman and Winquist (1998), through a questionnaire to 50 undergraduate students, 
examined tipping rates for restaurant and other service encounters and noted that smaller bill size 
was associated with a higher tip percentage and attributed this to a decision bias titled, “the 
magnitude effect.”  While the concept of magnitude effect is normally associated with 
intertemporal choice, this magnitude effect is explained by the principle of increasing 
proportional sensitivity in consumers’ utility function for money (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991).  
This principle posits that the ratio of two dollar amounts will seem larger as the magnitude of 
those dollars increase.  For example, a $2 tip on a $10 bill (20% ratio) seems smaller than a $10 
tip on a $50 bill (also a 20% ratio).    An alternative explanation is that the consumers’ sense of 
fairness commanded that a larger tip be paid because the server was working just as hard as they 
would have were the check larger.   
Conlin, Lynn, and O’Donoghue (2003) through a survey of 1,393 customers outside 39 
Houston restaurants also found a negative correlation between bill size and tipping rates.  They 
also found that the percent decreases with bill size at a decreasing rate.  The bill size minimum 
for this function was at $90.50 and beyond that the tip percent began increasing. 
Lynn and Latane (1984) interviewed 169 groups of diners outside an inexpensively- 
priced Columbus, OH restaurant and found the larger the per-person bill size, the smaller the 
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percentage of total bill tipped.  In a separate study, 206 transactions were captured at a 
moderately high priced restaurant and found per person bill size was unrelated to the percent tip.  
The influence of per-person bill size instead of total bill size may be confounded by the total 
number in the dining party which may bias the results.   
Lynn and Sturman (2003) conducted a simulation based on an American Demographics 
magazine phone survey and explained the magnitude effect by the existence of flat-dollar tippers, 
tippers who tip a flat amount rather than a percentage of the bill.  Assuming an x-y axis with the 
bill size on the x-axis, the authors assumed flat tippers produce a positive intercept and percent 
tippers produce a zero intercept and that the combined sample would produce an intercept 
somewhere in between.  They concluded that as a result of the positive intercept, the tipping rate 
will mathematically increase with smaller bill sizes.  The flaw in this logic is that if the flat 
tippers are “bad” tippers (flat tip amount < 10% of the bill), when they are blended with percent 
tippers they can actually create a negative blended intercept.        
Party Size 
Empirical studies regarding the effect of party size on tipping behavior is have yielded 
mixed results.  Lynn and Grassman (1990) conducted 106 interviews outside one full service 
restaurant and found no correlation between group size and tipping.  In this study, the authors 
advocated for using dollar tip as the DV because a percent tip could create spurious results 
because of a potential non-zero intercept.  This topic will be addressed further in the model 
specification section.   
Lynn and Graves (1996) recruited hospitality students to interview 161 dining parties 
outside two Houston-area casual dining restaurants.  The results for one restaurant indicated a 
significant relationship between party size and tip amount while the other restaurant did not. 
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Freeman et al. (1975) recorded the behavior of 396 groups of diners at one restaurant and 
found a negative correlation between party size and tip rate.  Specifically, they found the 
relationship between tip percentage and party size was an inverse power function and supported 
the theory of diffusion of responsibility.   This theory of diffusion of responsibility by Latané and 
Darley (1970) is based on the 1964 murder of Kitty Genovese in Queens where numerous 
witnesses refused to call for help or offer aid and states that the responsibility for helping is 
psychologically divided among those present, leading each person to feel less responsible to take 
action.  The authors posit that this same theory may apply to non-emergency, dining situations.  
The precept is that with larger dining parties, each member of the party feels proportionately less 
responsibility to take care of the waiter and, as a result, tips less than if they were dining alone. 
Snyder (1976) explained the reduction in tip percentage as a function of party size is the 
result of customers considering that it is easier to serve one large group rather than the same 
number of individuals at different tables with the same bill size.  He countered the theory of 
diffusion of responsibility with the theory of equity.  This theory of equity was proposed by 
Adams (1965) and focuses on determining whether the distribution of resources is fair to both 
relational partners.  It states that people feel distress when the benefits they get and give in their 
relationships with others are not proportional to one another. 
Boyes, Mounts, and Sowell (2004) conducted 360 surveys involving patrons and servers 
at 18 Phoenix area restaurants.  After cleansing the survey data, 160 surveys remained.  The 
coefficient for party size was negative and significant and indicated that free-riding behavior was 
taking place. 
Gibson (1997) surveyed 680 diners outside seven restaurants and found that lone diners 
tip at a higher rate than larger parties while parties of 2 to 4 tip at the same mean rate. 
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Lynn and Latane (1984) interviewed 169 groups of diners outside of an inexpensively-
priced Columbus, OH restaurant and found larger parties tipped a smaller percentage of their bill 
size than smaller parties.  In a separate study, 206 transactions were captured at a moderately 
high priced restaurant and, in this case, no relationship was indicated between party size and tip 
percentage.  The authors conjectured that this may be due to the price point and related service 
quality of the restaurant in that the servers were so attentive that customers did not feel 
anonymous and were unwilling to diffuse their responsibility to the server. 
Conlin et al. (2003) conducted 1,393 surveys outside of 39 Houston restaurants 
discovered that the percentage tip rate increases with group size.   
Contributions of This Study 
 A common question consumer’s face when computing a tip amount is how to treat 
discounts that reduce the face value of the guest bill such as a dollar-off, percentage-off, or a 
buy-one-get-one-free offer.  Consumers must decide whether to calculate the tip amount based 
on the gross value of the bill or the reduced, discounted amount.  The existing literature is 
lacking with regard to the empirical behavior of consumers when faced with a discounted guest 
check. 
 Another novel area of this study pertains to how the sales tax rate impacts tipping 
behavior.  Sales tax rates vary from 0% to over 10% in the U.S. and can significantly increase 
the total cost of dining out.  While sales taxes are simply collected by the restaurant, remitted in 
full to the taxing authorities, and not retained by the server or the owner, the tip amount could be 
impacted by the rate differential.  Etiquette guidelines have always advocated tipping on the 
pretax amount, but this may not happen in practice.  It is unclear how consumers treat sales tax 
when computing a tip and the current literature has not addressed such an impact, if any.  
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 Finally, most of the studies referenced in this section rely on relatively small samples, 
questionnaires, interviews, and surveys.  The challenge with these methods is that respondents 
may not be honest, may not accurately remember facts, or in the case of simulations, not actually 
be dining out.  The data in this study represents a sample of over 75 million guest checks over 
three years from a cross section of full service restaurant brands across the United States.  The 
data represents how consumers actually behaved and the data is objective in its recordation 
through the point of sale system. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DATA 
Overview 
The tipping data for this research come from a national provider of restaurant back-office 
software that imports and hosts point-of-sale data for its clients including bill-level detail.  This 
panel data comprises the software provider’s census of all full-service restaurant clients 
operating in the United States.  These clients represent 43 unique operating brands across 1,202 
locations in 42 states with annual revenues of $2.5 billion.  The time horizon of the data is the 
36-month period ended June 30, 2016.  The unit of observation is the restaurant bill which 
represents the items ordered and amount due for each payer in a restaurant transaction.  The data 
set consists of 75.8 million guest checks, or records.     
 The federal and state minimum wage rates for the time periods under study were sourced 
from the Department of Labor (https://www.dol.gov).  As it relates to the minimum wage 
guidelines provided by the Department of Labor, it was assumed that all restaurant brands under 
study were large employers and offered health insurance benefits to hourly employees.  In 
addition, all brands selected were required to comply with the FLSA.  The Quarterly Census of 
Earning and Wage (QCEW) data were sourced from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(https://data.bls.gov) for the NAICS code 722 - Food Services and Drinking Places. 
Limitations 
The variable for the size of the dining party is generally hand-keyed by the server into the 
point-of-sale system and is subject to human error.  This study assumes that the servers’ accuracy 
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of inputting such a metric is invariant over time and location and that there is no systematic bias 
in accuracy across the server population. 
The guest-check level data analyzed includes only those transactions tendered with a 
credit card.  This criterion was imposed to exclude cash or partial cash transactions whereby the 
amount of the tip cannot be independently verified through credit card processing.   
Dependent Variables 
 Tip Rate.  The tipping rate is defined as the amount of the tip provided by the consumer 
divided by the pretax, pre-discount gross sale amount on the bill.  While sales discounts may 
lower and sales taxes may increase the amount due from the consumer, etiquette dictates that 
consumers tip on the pretax sales amount before applying any discounts. 
   Tip Amount.  The tip amount is the dollar amount of tip provided by the consumer.  This 
second dependent variable is defined because another specification of the model employs tip 
dollars as the dependent variable versus tip rate (see Chapter 4). 
Primary Explanatory Variables 
Party Size.  The number of consumers whose meals are included on the bill.  This metric 
is generally hand-keyed into the point-of-sale terminal by the server, or in lieu of this manual 
entry the party size can be automatically calculated based on the number of entrees rung up on 
the guest check. 
Bill Size.  The total dollar value of all menu items rung on the guest check before 
deducting any sales discounts or adding any sales tax or tip. 
Discount Rate.  The amount by which gross sales were reduced to account for a sales 
discount as a percentage of the bill size.  A discount can take the form of a percentage- or dollar-
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off the guest check, a free meal, or other promotion whose intent is to reduce the amount payable 
by the consumer. 
Sales Tax Rate.  The amount charged for sales tax divided by gross sales.  It is the burden 
of the restaurant company to ensure the appropriate sales tax rate is programmed into the point-
of-sale system for each respective location’s jurisdiction.  The amount included as sales tax in 
the analysis represents such an amount and may not reflect the rate that is required by statute.    
Other Explanatory Variables 
Other explanatory variables include date-related dummy variable to control for tipping 
rate nuances on a given day of the week or a holiday.  The one day returns of the S&P 500 were 
added to control for the effect of stock market performance on tipping generosity.  In the event 
the market was closed, the most recent day’s return was deemed to be 0%.  Another control 
variable was the ratio of the statutory, state tipped minimum wage rate to the QCEW data for that 
location’s MSA computed as an hourly rate.  The variable is titled, TMW Ratio, with TMW 
representing “tipped minimum wage.”  If the location was not in an MSA or the survey was not 
complete for a given quarter, data for the entire state was substituted.  Finally, dummy variables 
for states were added to remove heterogeneity bias, and common economic fluctuations were 
eliminated through quarterly dummy variables. 
Summary Statistics 
The summary statistics are contained in Table 1.  The guest checks analyzed amounted to 
75,774,158 observations.  The dependent variable of focus in this study is the Tip Rate with an 
average of 21.0% and a range of 0.0% to 81.5%.  The alternative dependent variable, Tip 
Amount, ranged from $0.01 to $174.32 with an average of $6.55.  The Bill Size had an average of 
$33.08 and a range of $0.02 to $216.00.  The number of individuals in the dining party (Party 
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Size) range from 1 to 7 with an average of 2.0.  The average Discount Rate was 1.5% and ranged 
from 0% to 50%, consistent with a in a buy-one-get-one-free offer.  Finally, the average Sales 
Tax Rate ranged from 0% to 13.5% with an average of 7.1%. 
Table 1: Description of Variables 
Variable Description 
Party Size Discrete, size of the dining party present on a guest check 
Bill Size Continuous, amount owed before sales tax, discounts, and gratuity 
Discount Rate Continuous, amount of discount divided by Bill Size 
Sales Tax Rate Continuous, amount of sales tax divided by net sales (Bill Size less sales discounts) 
TMW Ratio Continuous, the tipped minimum wage rate divided by the MSA’s QCEW hourly rate 
S&P500 Return Continuous, the one-day return on the S&P 500 index of equities 
Weekday Dummy variable for each weekday excluding Sunday 
Holiday Dummy variable for each holiday excluding Christmas 
State Dummy variable for each state excluding Alabama 
Time Dummy variable for each quarter excluding Q32013 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Variable mean sd min max 
Dependent Variables    
Tip Rate 21.0% 8.0% 0.0% 81.5% 
Tip Amount $6.55  $5.96  $0.01  $174.32  
     
Independent Variables    
Party Size 2.0  1.1  1  7  
Party Size2 5.2  6.6  1  49  
Bill Size $33.08  $28.25  $0.02  $216.00  
Bill Size2 $1,893  $4,404  $0.0004  $46,656  
Discount Rate 1.5% 6.2% 0.0% 50.0% 
Sales Tax Rate 7.1% 2.3% 0.0% 13.5% 
TMW Ratio 0.48 0.25 0.18 1.38 
S&P500 Return 0.0% 0.7% -3.9% 3.9% 
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
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Tip Rate 1.00          
           
Tip Amount 0.15 1.00         
 0.00          
Party Size -0.17 0.35 1.00        
 0.00 0.00         
Party Size2 -0.14 0.33 0.96 1.00       
 0.00 0.00 0.00        
Bill Size -0.17 0.90 0.42 0.40 1.00      
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00       
Bill Size2 -0.08 0.85 0.29 0.28 0.93 1.00     
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00      
Discount Rate -0.07 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 1.00    
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Sales Tax Rate 0.10 0.11 -0.06 -0.04 0.07 0.07 -0.21 1.00   
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00    
S&P500 Return 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00  
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.00   
TMW Ratio -0.10 0.00 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.08 -0.43 0.00 1.00 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Note: Italicized numbers represent p > |t|           
 
Table 4: Univariate Statistics – Variable Means Cut by Tipping Rate Quintiles 
  Quintile   
  1 2 3 4 5 Q5-Q1 
Dependent Variables       
Tip Rate 12.2% 17.5% 20.2% 22.6% 32.3% 2010bps 
Tip Amount $4.35  $6.16  $7.72  $7.65  $6.89  $2.53  
       
Independent Variables       
Party Size 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.6 (0.6) 
Party Size2 6.1 5.7 5.9 5.0 3.2 (2.8) 
Bill Size $36  $35  $38  $34  $22  ($14) 
Bill Size2 $1,955  $2,010  $2,468  $2,055  $975  ($979) 
Discount Rate 2.8% 1.6% 1.1% 0.9% 1.0%  (173bps) 
Sales Tax Rate 6.5% 7.0% 7.1% 7.4% 7.3% 80bps 
TMW Ratio 0.54 0.48 0.47 0.45 0.45 (0.1) 
S&P500 Return 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.03% 0.2bps 
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CHAPTER 4 
IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY 
This study analyzed a significant sample of guest checks from full-service restaurants 
across the United States to understand the impact certain factors had on the tipping rate paid to 
servers by consumers.  To examine the determinants of tipping rates, the study estimated models 
of the following form:   
Tip_Ratelt = β0 + β1Party_Sizelt + β2Party_Size2lt + β3Bill_Sizelt + β4Bill_Size2lt + β5Discount_Ratelt + 
β6SSales_Tax_Ratelt + β7S + β8X + β9T+ β10Y + β11Z + Elt 
where;  
Subscripts l and t represent restaurant location and time, respectively;  
Tip Rate represents the tipping rate;  
Party Size represents the number of consumers accounted for on the guest check;  
Bill Size represents the amount of the sale before discounts, sales tax, and tip;  
Discount Rate represents the ratio of the discount amount to the gross sale;  
Sales Tax Rate represents the amount of sales tax divided by the gross sale;  
vector S represents state dummy variables;  
vector X represents date specific characteristics (day of week, holiday);  
vector T represents quarterly time dummy variables;  
vector Y represents macroeconomic data (S&P 500 returns, wages);  
vector Z represents dummy variables associated with each of the 42 unique restaurant 
brands studied; 
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Elt represents unobservable factors that are assumed to be normally distributed and 
independent. 
 The data were analyzed using a two-way fixed effects ordinary least squares model to 
limit time and spatial controls to a single national time trend with state fixed effects.  The state 
fixed effects controls for differences across states that are fixed over time, and quarterly fixed 
effects control for factors that impact tipping rates equally across all states in a given quarter.  
Robust standard errors were clustered for the 1,202 locations and 12 quarters of time to account 
for temporal serial correlation in the error terms within the locations. 
 Lynn and Grassman (1990) caution against the use of ratio variables such as Tip Rate as a 
dependent variable.  The authors suggest that if the relationship between Tip Amount and Bill 
Size has a non-zero intercept using it can produce spurious results.  While, Kronmal (1993) 
concludes that ratio variables should only be used in the context of a full linear model and that 
variables that make up the ratio are included along with the intercept.  Despite the lack of 
consensus regarding ratio variables, this study employs Tip Amount as a dependent variable in 
another model specification to address such a concern. 
With regard to the research questions under study the coefficient and t-statistic associated 
with the variables of interest will indicate the direction, magnitude and significance of these 
variables and their relation to the Tip Rate and Tip Amount.  
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
 In this section, I will explain the results summarized in Table 5.  The results detail 
two specifications for the tipping relationship: columns A and B analyze Tip Rate as the 
dependent variable, and columns C and D analyze Tip Amount as the dependent variable.  The 
models specified in columns B and D omitted state and time fixed effects and were included as a 
robustness check on the two specifications.  The change in the results after omitting state and 
time fixed effects are as follows: (1) the TMW Ratio becomes insignificant under both model 
specifications, and (2) the constant term becomes significant in the model where Tip Amount is 
the dependent variable (column D). All other variables presented remain directionally the same 
with significance at an alpha of at least .01. 
Table 5 shows that Party Size, Bill Size, Discount Rate, and Sales Tax Rate are all 
statistically significant in predicting tipping rates (columns A and B).  When state and time fixed 
effects are excluded the predictive value drops by a nominal amount (column B).  Except for 
Party Size, the same variables are also significant in predicting the dollar amount of the tip.  
When the fixed effects are excluded from the model, the reduction in predictive value is also 
insignificant (column D). 
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Table 5: Model Summaries – Guest-Check-Level Detail Analysis 
  % Tip x 100 $ Tip 
 A B C D 
  Full Model No FEs Full Model No FEs 
Party Size -1.27 ** -1.24 ** 0.07  0.08  
 (0.41)  (0.42)  (0.11)  (0.11)  
Party Size2 0.22 *** 0.22 *** -0.02  -0.02  
 (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Bill Size -0.21 *** -0.21 *** 0.16 *** 0.16 *** 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Bill Size2 0.0009 *** 0.0009 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0001 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Discount Rate -3.24 ** -4.63 *** -1.19 ** -1.76 *** 
 (1.20)  (1.01)  (0.54)  (0.45)  
Sales Tax Rate 40.90 *** 19.49 *** 14.97 *** 5.94 *** 
 (10.31)  (3.44)  (3.74)  (1.59)  
S&P500 Return -0.17  -0.38  -0.05 ** -0.14 ** 
 (0.23)  (0.25)  (0.03)  (0.06)  
TMW Ratio -1.23 ** -0.39  -0.34 ** -0.21  
 (0.39)  (0.41)  (0.10)  (0.21)  
Constant 25.92 *** 28.33 *** -0.48  0.65 ** 
 (1.36)  (0.88)  (0.41)  (0.29)  
         
F 1307  674  48504  29735  
Prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
R-Sq 0.1184  0.1166  0.8227  0.8220  
Root MSE 0.0747   0.0748   2.5104   2.5153   
Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust and clustered at the brand and time level. 
* P < .05, ** P < .01, *** p < .001 
 
 The inclusion of the dollar-tip specification was a robustness check to address the 
concerns of Lynn and Bond (1992).  The authors’ issue was in that spurious correlation would 
stem from a non-zero intercept in a model that used the tipping rate ratio as the dependent 
variable.  As expected, the intercept term in the tipping rate specification was significantly 
different from zero.  The differences that arise between model A and model C are as follows:  
Party Size and its squared term are no longer significant, Bill Size remains significant although 
its direction changes, the S&P 500 Return variable becomes significant, and as mentioned 
earlier, the constant becomes insignificant. 
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Following is a discussion of the economic significance of each of the statistically 
significant explanatory variables under the full models (columns A and C). 
Discount Rate 
 
 As the Discount Rate increases, both the Tip Rate and the Tip Amount decline.  For every 
1% of sales discount, the Tip Rate declines 3 basis points and this coefficient is significant at an 
alpha of .01. While the economic significance of this is immaterial for small discounts, for a 50% 
discount (as in a buy-one-get-one-free offer) this would translate into a 162 basis point drop in 
the Tip Rate or a $0.59 loss in dollars.  With an average tipping rate of 21%, such a drop would 
result in a 7.7% (1.62/21) lower tip.  In terms of tip amount, the estimated drop ($0.59) is about 
9% of the average tip amount ($6.55). These findings support H1 that there is an inverse 
relationship between discount rates and tipping rates.  
  
Sales Tax Rate 
 As the sales tax rate increases both the Tip Rate and the Tip Amount increase.  For every 
1% increase in the Sales Tax Rate, the Tip Rate increases 41 basis points and the Tip Amount 
increases $0.15.  In the case of a restaurant with $3 million in annual revenues and a 10% sales 
tax rate, tips in that restaurant would be $1,230 ($3 million sales x 10% sales tax rate x 0.41%) 
higher than a restaurant where sales tax is not levied.   Both of these coefficients are significant 
24 
 
at an alpha of .001.  These findings support H2 that there is a positive relationship between sales 
tax rates and tipping rates. 
  
Party Size 
Column A of Table 3 show that as the party size grows the tip rate declines but at a 
decreasing rate.  Beyond three customers the tipping rate rises at an increasing rate.  For every 
additional increase in party size the tipping rate falls by 127 basis points.  This decrease is 
mitigated and reversed by the fact that the quadratic term is positive and for each squared value 
of party size the tipping rate increases by 22 basis points.  Both the coefficients are significant at 
an alpha of .01.  The hypothesis (H3) is partially accepted in that tipping rates do decline as party 
size increases but not along the entire continuum of party sizes.  It was unanticipated that the 
quadratic term would be significant enough to reverse the relationship beyond a party size of 
three.    
In the full model with Tip Amount as the DV (column C), neither Party Size nor its 
quadratic term are statistically significant.  This is not surprising since the party size, the bill 
size, and the resulting tip are closely correlated. 
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Bill Size 
In the full model with tip rate as the DV (column A), the tipping rate declines as the bill 
size increases but only up to a certain point.  Just beyond a $110 bill size, the tipping rate rises at 
an increasing rate.  For every dollar increase in bill size, the tipping rate drops by 21 basis points.  
This drop is mitigated by the quadratic term where for every squared dollar of bill size, tipping 
rate increases .09 basis points.  Both of these coefficients are significant at an alpha of 0.001.  
For an average bill of $33, bill this would mean a decrease of 581 basis points in the tip rate, or 
$1.92.  The hypothesis (H4) is partially accepted in that tipping rates do decline as the bill size 
increases but not along the entire continuum of bill sizes.  It was unanticipated that the quadratic 
term would be significant enough to reverse the relationship beyond a bill size of $110.    
In column (C), where tip amount is the DV, as the bill size grows the tip amount declines 
but at a slightly decreasing rate.  For every dollar of bill size, the tip amount increases by $0.16.  
The tip amount is further augmented by the quadratic term where for every squared dollar of bill 
size the tip amount increases by 1/100 of a cent.  For the average bill, this amounts to $0.11 
(=$33.08^2 x .0001).  
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Ancillary Findings 
While the control variables were not the main items of interest, there are some interesting 
and statistically significant findings.  The coefficient and standard error statistics presented in 
this section refer to the full model using Tip Rate as the dependent variable (column A).  The 
coefficients and standard errors are formatted as (Tip Rate % x 100).  
TMW Ratio 
 The TMW Ratio varied in the data set from 0.18 to 1.38 and is a significant control 
variable at an alpha of .01.  For a 1.00 point move in this ratio, the tipping rate declines 123 basis 
points, or a 5.9% reduction in the tip amount.  
Day of Week 
 Table 6 details the summary statistics and model impact for the day-of-week dummy 
variables.  Sunday had the lowest tipping rate of any other day of the week closely followed by 
Saturday.  The dummy variable coefficients for day of the week were all significant at an alpha 
of .01.  One can expect a higher tip rate Monday through Friday of between 70 and 130 basis 
points. 
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Table 6: Day of Week – Summary Statistics and Model Impact 
   Summary Statistics   Model Impact 
Weekday  N  mean sd min max  Coef.  Std. Err. 
Sunday      12,008,669  20.2% 7.3% 0.0% 81.5%  Omitted 
Monday        8,237,595  21.3% 8.1% 0.0% 81.5%  0.43 *** 0.06 
Tuesday        8,752,832  21.5% 8.2% 0.0% 81.5%  0.52 *** 0.07 
Wednesday        9,459,920  21.3% 8.2% 0.0% 81.5%  0.41 *** 0.09 
Thursday        9,906,877  21.5% 8.4% 0.0% 81.5%  0.55 *** 0.09 
Friday      13,351,375  21.1% 8.1% 0.0% 81.5%  0.36 *** 0.04 
Saturday      14,056,890  20.4% 7.5% 0.0% 81.5%  0.12 *** 0.03 
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the brand and time level. 
* P < .05, ** P < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Holidays 
Table 7 details the summary statistics and model impact for the holiday dummy variables.  
The dummy variable coefficients for holidays were all significant at an alpha of at least .01.  
With the exception of Christmas Eve and St. Patrick’s Day, tipping rates during holidays are 
lower than those of non-holiday days by between 10 and 160 basis points. 
Table 7: Holidays – Summary Statistics and Model Impact 
   Summary Statistics   Model Impact 
Holiday           N  mean sd min max  Coef.   
Std. 
Err. 
Christmas 53,431  20.1% 10.0% 0.0% 81.4%  1.58 *** 0.19  
Christmas Eve 143,780  21.2% 9.3% 0.0% 81.5%  1.08 *** 0.11  
Father’s Day 272,451  19.7% 7.1% 0.0% 81.4%  0.10 ** 0.04  
Easter 212,264  20.1% 7.4% 0.0% 81.5%  0.21 *** 0.05  
Fourth Of July 179,056  20.3% 7.5% 0.0% 81.5%  -0.15  0.11  
Halloween 208,532  20.7% 8.0% 0.0% 81.5%  -0.25 *** 0.04  
Labor Day 198,524  20.4% 7.3% 0.0% 81.5%  -0.35 *** 0.06  
Memorial Day 211,604  20.4% 7.5% 0.0% 81.5%  -0.35 *** 0.06  
Mother’s Day 299,944  19.6% 7.1% 0.0% 81.5%  0.16  0.08  
None 73,001,448  21.0% 8.0% 0.0% 81.5%  Omitted   
New Year’s Day 200,142  20.6% 7.7% 0.0% 81.5%  -0.22 ** 0.08  
New Year’s Eve 217,950  20.9% 8.0% 0.0% 81.4%  0.06  0.06  
St Patrick’s Day 193,529  21.4% 8.3% 0.0% 81.5%  -0.10 *** 0.01  
Thanksgiving Day 53,453  19.4% 9.3% 0.0% 81.4%  0.48 ** 0.18  
4Valentine’s Day                 328,050  20.0% 7.4% 0.0% 81.5%  -0.26 ** 0.10  
 
Additional Robustness Checks 
As an additional robustness check, the data set was refined by calculating averages for 
each restaurant for each day of operation (restaurant-day) for the variables under study.  Rate-
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related variables were then computed on the restaurant-day average data.  Collapsing the guest 
check level detail into restaurant-day averages resulted in approximately 1 million records.  The 
results of this analysis are presented in Table 8 below. 
Table 8: Model Summaries – Restaurant-Day Aggregate Analysis 
  % Tip x 100 $ Tip 
 A B C D 
  Full Model No FEs Full Model No FEs 
Party Size 0.07  0.07  -0.04  -0.03  
 (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.15)  (0.15)  
Party Size2 -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
Bill Size -0.01 ** -0.01 ** 0.17 *** 0.17 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Bill Size2 0.00005 ** 0.00005 ** 0.0001 ** 0.0001 ** 
 (0.00002)  (0.00002)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Discount Rate -5.61 *** -5.92 *** -2.68 *** -2.88 *** 
 (1.31)  (1.46)  (0.48)  (0.43)  
Sales Tax Rate 22.05 *** 11.92 *** 7.75 *** 2.78 *** 
 (5.82)  (1.75)  (1.43)  (0.56)  
S&P500 Return -0.64  -0.68  0.07  -0.09  
 (0.39)  (0.45)  (0.40)  (0.43)  
TMW Ratio -0.80  -0.71 ** -0.21  -0.70 ** 
 (0.73)  (0.36)  (0.18)  (0.35)  
Constant 18.40 *** 19.81 *** 0.22  1.18 ** 
 (0.68)  (0.43)  (0.37)  (0.40)  
         
F 942  676  78439  11504  
Prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
R-Sq 0.3498  0.3386  0.8465  0.8460  
Root MSE 0.0216   0.0218   3.2327   3.2383   
Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust and clustered at the brand and time level. 
* P < .05, ** P < .01, *** p < .001 
 
 The key differences in results between the analysis using restaurant-day aggregates and 
the analysis using check-level detail are as follows: (1) Party Size and its quadratic are no longer 
significant under models A and B (2) S&P500 Return is no longer significant under models C 
and D (3) TMW Ratio is no longer significant under models A and C but become significant 
under models B and D.  Conversely, the significance and coefficient direction remain the same 
for Bill Size, Discount Rate, and Sales Tax Rate.  In addition, the sign of the constant term and its 
significance remains unchanged. 
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 One final robustness check was to remove the quadratic terms and compare the results to 
the full models specified in columns A and C of Table 5.  The results are presented in table 9 
below.  In both specifications, the direction of the coefficients remained unchanged and all 
variables remained significant.  In addition, the constant term under the Tip Amount specification 
becomes significant.    
Table 9: Model Summaries – Guest Check Level Detail Analysis / No Quadratic Terms 
  % Tip x 100 $ Tip 
 A No Sq C No Sq 
  Full Model Terms Full Model Terms 
Party Size -1.27 ** -0.48 ** 0.07  -0.09  
 (0.41)  (0.17)  (0.11)  (0.06)  
Party Size2 0.22 ***  -0.02    
 (0.06)    (0.01)    
Bill Size -0.21 *** -0.06 *** 0.16 *** 0.18 *** 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.00)  
Bill Size2 0.0009 ***  0.0001 ***   
 (0.00)    (0.00)    
Discount Rate -3.24 ** -4.28 ** -1.19 ** -1.28 ** 
 (1.20)  (1.46)  (0.54)  (0.57)  
Sales Tax Rate 40.90 *** 40.45 *** 14.97 *** 15.09 *** 
 (10.31)  (10.45)  (3.74)  (3.91)  
S&P500 Return -0.17  -0.34  -0.05 ** -0.08 *** 
 (0.23)  (0.21)  (0.03)  (0.02)  
TMW Ratio -1.23 ** -1.27 ** -0.34 ** -0.34 ** 
 (0.39)  (0.42)  (0.10)  (0.10)  
Constant 25.92 *** 22.48 *** -0.48      -.74 * 
 (1.36)  (1.36)  (0.41)     (.42)  
         
F 1307  1227  48504  52308  
Prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
R-Sq 0.1184  0.0816  0.8227  0.8216  
Root MSE 0.0747   0.0763   2.5104   2.5153   
Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust and clustered at the brand and time level. 
* P < .05, ** P < .01, *** p < .001 
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION 
 This research sought to better understand certain determinants of tipping behavior and 
their impact to tipping levels.  The motivation for this study was to prepare restaurant operators 
for the potential abolishment of tipping and the need to determine equitable and motivating fixed 
hourly wage rates for their service staff.  The focus of this research was to ascertain whether 
sales tax rates or sales discounts influenced tipping behavior.  It empirically answers the question 
of how consumers tip when provided with a sales discount and provides new insight into how 
consumers treat sales tax when calculating a tip.  These determinants have previously not been 
studied.  A secondary focus of this research was to extend existing research regarding the effect 
of bill size and party size on tips, but using a significantly larger and more diverse data set than 
had been used in prior research. 
 All of the hypotheses were supported by the analysis.  There is an inverse relationship 
between sales discount rates and the tipping rate and a positive relationship between sales tax 
rates and the tipping rates.  As the size of the dining party increases, the tipping rate decreases, 
but at a decreasing rate.  As the size of the restaurant bill increases, the tipping rate decreases, 
but at a decreasing rate. 
One explanation for the decreasing rate phenomena is that some restaurants enforce an 
automatic gratuity once the party size reaches a certain level or there may be other social norm 
dynamics at play when the party size increases beyond a certain level.  Since party size and bill 
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size are correlated, the same rationale could be applied to an increasing bill size effect on tipping 
rates.  
The theory of bounded rationality has long been used to explain tipping and the use of a 
tipping heuristic (i.e. 15% to 20% of the bill).  This theory’s application can be broadened to and 
is more relevant in explaining tipping behavior when sales discounts and sales taxes are 
involved.  Economically, the presence of sales taxes increase the total cost of dining out and 
places downward pressure on restaurant demand.  Surprisingly, consumers augment this 
additional cost of dining out by including the sales tax when computing the tip amount.  There is 
no rationale for this practice: the tipping norm does not call for it, there is no economic gain to 
the consumer, and there is no reason to think consumers in sales taxing jurisdictions have a 
greater need to “buy” their server’s envy or flaunt their status.  The opposite behavior applies to 
consumers’ treatment of sales discounts when deriving a tip.  When consumers tip on the 
reduced amount, they violate a social norm, lose the respect of the server and, potentially, 
members of the dining party, but they do realize an economic gain.  I contend that both behaviors 
stem from the same cause, bounded rationality.  It is simply too inconvenient, time consuming, 
or difficult to address these issues when computing a tip.   
Fixing the hourly rate of server wages affects many stakeholders in a restaurant 
transaction: the owner, the customer, the IRS, and, more importantly, the server.  The more 
intelligent restaurateurs can become in understanding the drivers of tipping rates, the better they 
will be armed to deal with an environment where this aged custom no longer exists.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Table 10:  Restaurant Brand Identifiers – Summary Statistics and Model Impact 
 
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the brand and time level. 
* P < .05, ** P < .01, *** p < .001 
  
Brand N mean sd min max Coef. Std. Err.
101 716,224           22.7% 11.8% 0.0% 81.5%
102 156,913           21.0% 8.0% 0.0% 81.5% 1.12 ** 0.24
103 537,290           20.8% 7.0% 0.0% 81.4% 2.23 ** 0.30
105 579,721           20.0% 10.0% 0.0% 81.5% 0.36 ** 0.25
107 93,654             21.9% 6.4% 0.0% 81.5% 0.84 ** 0.34
110 360,943           20.1% 5.8% 0.0% 81.5% 1.12 ** 0.60
112 606,857           21.0% 6.9% 0.0% 81.5% 0.90 ** 0.22
114 54,700             19.8% 5.6% 0.2% 80.9% 2.87 ** 0.60
116 4,715,203        20.4% 8.0% 0.0% 81.5% -1.32 *** 0.12
118 281,301           21.7% 8.6% 0.0% 81.4% 0.10 ** 0.18
121 2,093,324        18.5% 6.5% 0.0% 81.2% -2.67 *** 0.50
123 604,871           20.8% 6.4% 0.0% 81.5% 0.61 ** 0.21
127 797,277           20.4% 6.9% 0.0% 81.5% 2.22 ** 0.27
129 792,556           17.7% 9.5% 0.0% 81.5% -2.65 *** 0.31
131 280,545           19.5% 8.5% 0.0% 81.5% -0.82 *** 0.16
132 201,050           21.4% 7.8% 0.0% 81.5% 1.15 ** 0.22
135 2,663,668        20.5% 6.3% 0.0% 81.5% 3.21 ** 0.34
136 539,866           22.2% 8.2% 0.0% 81.5% 0.58 ** 0.16
137 776,056           21.1% 9.6% 0.0% 81.5% -1.24 *** 0.26
140 413,344           18.5% 5.7% 0.0% 81.4% 0.19 ** 0.25
143 214,660           20.6% 8.6% 0.0% 81.4% -1.04 *** 0.15
150 44,979             21.0% 7.4% 0.0% 81.4% 3.45 ** 0.29
152 1,892,905        20.3% 8.0% 0.0% 81.5% -2.09 *** 0.10
155 143,411           19.7% 7.7% 0.0% 81.4% -1.64 *** 0.24
160 111,031           19.4% 6.9% 0.0% 81.3% -0.68 *** 0.21
164 3,072,811        19.3% 7.6% 0.0% 81.5% -1.77 *** 0.23
169 1,079,572        21.9% 9.1% 0.0% 81.5% -1.23 *** 0.19
170 787,066           23.4% 10.7% 0.0% 81.5% 2.03 ** 0.17
171 17,846,604      22.3% 8.1% 0.0% 81.5% 0.01 ** 0.13
173 1,111,299        20.2% 7.7% 0.0% 81.5% 0.25 ** 0.54
174 14,362,466      21.7% 7.1% 0.0% 81.5% -1.04 *** 0.15
177 1,714,660        21.2% 7.3% 0.0% 81.5% 0.60 ** 0.26
181 165,905           20.2% 9.1% 0.0% 81.5% -0.48 *** 0.21
185 721,861           21.6% 7.1% 0.0% 81.5% 3.59 ** 0.39
188 7,419,823        18.7% 8.4% 0.0% 81.5% -1.76 *** 0.29
191 530,245           20.6% 6.2% 0.0% 81.4% 0.29 ** 0.18
192 770,178           20.3% 5.5% 0.0% 81.5% 2.14 ** 0.31
193 64,358             26.6% 13.1% 0.0% 81.5% 2.51 ** 0.17
196 3,361,754        20.3% 7.2% 0.0% 81.5% -1.70 *** 0.15
198 936,648           19.2% 5.6% 0.0% 81.4% -0.06 ** 0.19
199 441,940           22.7% 12.6% 0.0% 81.5% -0.49 *** 0.11
200 820,001           23.3% 9.7% 0.0% 81.5% 1.29 ** 0.08
201 894,618           23.2% 9.6% 0.0% 81.5% 1.29 ** 0.08
Summary Statistics Model Impact
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APPENDIX 2 
Table 11:  States – Summary Statistics and Model Impact 
  
Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust and clustered at the brand and time level. 
* P < .05, ** P < .01, *** p < .001 
 
State N mean sd min max Coef. Std. Err.
AL 575,623 22.6% 8.5% 0.0% 81.5% Omitted
AR 577,554 21.4% 8.2% 0.0% 81.5% -0.76 *** 0.12
AZ 1,948,261 21.3% 6.8% 0.0% 81.5% 1.10 *** 0.29
CA 2,128,319 20.0% 8.2% 0.0% 81.5% 0.23 0.42
CO 927,376 20.4% 6.8% 0.0% 81.5% 0.74 ** 0.32
CT 47,996 20.9% 6.9% 0.0% 81.1% 1.30 ** 0.46
DC 352,682 20.5% 6.1% 0.0% 81.5% 0.69 0.61
DE 20,578 20.0% 4.9% 0.1% 78.3% 3.80 ** 1.10
FL 15,678,411 21.3% 8.0% 0.0% 81.5% 1.43 ** 0.41
GA 1,622,317 21.2% 7.5% 0.0% 81.5% 0.99 ** 0.43
ID 723,493 19.1% 8.5% 0.0% 81.4% 0.56 0.51
IL 2,367,538 19.1% 6.8% 0.0% 81.4% 0.89 0.56
IN 711,294 22.1% 7.2% 0.0% 81.4% 0.52 0.26
KS 1,081,824 21.4% 7.5% 0.0% 81.5% -0.17 0.66
KY 1,435,894 21.8% 7.5% 0.0% 81.5% 1.08 ** 0.46
LA 599,458 20.7% 8.6% 0.0% 81.5% -0.07 0.35
MA 100,113 20.9% 5.3% 0.0% 81.5% 0.90 ** 0.39
MD 1,104,763 20.3% 6.6% 0.0% 81.4% 1.62 *** 0.42
MI 1,638,686 21.9% 8.7% 0.0% 81.5% 1.64 ** 0.52
MN 57,827 19.5% 5.9% 0.0% 80.3% 1.30 0.93
MO 1,274,302 22.1% 7.2% 0.0% 81.5% 0.84 ** 0.30
MT 420,009 19.4% 7.4% 0.0% 81.5% 3.67 *** 0.78
NC 2,232,208 20.9% 7.7% 0.0% 81.5% 0.78 ** 0.38
NE 139,992 21.4% 8.0% 0.0% 81.4% 0.40 0.21
NJ 201,348 20.4% 5.6% 0.0% 81.4% 1.39 ** 0.59
NM 59,324 20.6% 7.2% 0.0% 80.4% 1.45 *** 0.35
NV 171,481 19.9% 6.0% 0.0% 81.5% 0.35 0.39
NY 860,972 20.9% 7.0% 0.0% 81.5% 0.50 ** 0.26
OH 3,086,235 21.7% 7.1% 0.0% 81.5% 1.13 ** 0.38
OK 1,137,054 21.2% 8.3% 0.0% 81.5% -0.09 0.29
OR 3,558,234 18.1% 8.2% 0.0% 81.5% 2.32 ** 1.04
PA 342,391 21.6% 6.5% 0.0% 81.4% 1.80 *** 0.44
RI 17,346 20.8% 5.6% 0.1% 81.1% 0.84 ** 0.29
SC 2,787,947 20.9% 8.3% 0.0% 81.5% 0.25 0.23
TN 2,870,475 22.1% 7.9% 0.0% 81.5% 0.00 0.10
TX 13,191,979 21.9% 8.5% 0.0% 81.5% 0.37 ** 0.18
UT 28,687 20.1% 5.9% 0.0% 81.3% 0.18 0.25
VA 2,343,750 21.5% 7.1% 0.0% 81.5% 1.18 *** 0.24
WA 2,938,855 19.1% 8.4% 0.0% 81.5% -0.01 0.47
WI 3,865,093 19.6% 7.5% 0.0% 81.5% 0.98 0.59
WV 193,969 21.5% 7.6% 0.0% 81.5% 1.77 *** 0.40
WY 352,500 20.8% 7.8% 0.0% 81.5% 2.04 *** 0.36
Summary Statistics Model Impact
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APPENDIX 3 
Table 12: Tipping Rate Summary Statistics Cut by Party Size 
Party 
Size N mean sd min max 
1   29,577,737  22.87% 9.57% 0.00% 81.50% 
2   30,151,955  20.25% 6.60% 0.00% 81.50% 
3     8,051,443  19.06% 6.18% 0.00% 81.50% 
4     5,100,581  18.73% 5.85% 0.00% 81.49% 
5     1,748,729  18.60% 5.96% 0.00% 81.49% 
6        830,594  18.92% 6.14% 0.00% 81.48% 
7        313,119  19.08% 6.34% 0.00% 81.48% 
 
 
